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ABSTRACT1 
Facebook has created a complex system of controls to 
manage disclosure in an effort to help users address 
privacy concerns. Do these controls work in practice? 
What about controls for disclosure to Facebook itself? 
We explore user relationships with Facebook and its 
privacy mechanisms using scenario building and 
explored their reactions. We then confronted them with 
their actual practices by using Facebook’s apps 
permissions screen. While the majority of respondents 
felt responsible for their data disclosure, they failed to 
live up to their own expectations. We argue that the 
complexity of privacy controls places unrealistic 
responsibilities on the users, while masking the way 
Facebook itself collects user data. There is an urgent 
need to establish clear and explicit basic privacy norms 
for user relationships with social media companies.  
CCS CONCEPTS 
• Human-centered computing ~ Empirical studies in 
HCI 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
People are often left wondering how to behave as 
citizens in a digital world where increasingly common 
and large-scale data leaks 2  create concern about the 
impact personal data practices might have on individual 
lives. Ostensibly, managing personal data is an individual 
responsibility. Ubiquitous Terms of Services (ToS) and 
End User License Agreements (EULA) inform users of 
their rights and responsibilities. Extensive and often 
complicated, these texts detail the contract of data 
exchange into which people enter when using any digital 
service. Researchers have put much effort into better 
1https://techcrunch.com/2017/09/07/equifax-data-leak-could-
involve-143-million-consumers/ 
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design of EULAs and into novel ways of assisting the user 
in making these decisions [39]. Few of these efforts are 
successful and users continue to ignore these contracts 
[8] in part because the complexity and time demands of 
becoming truly informed to make each disclosure 
decision remain enormous [22].  
Nevertheless, millions of people share their personal 
data on popular social media sites every day and the 
volume of data is only growing. The largest and most 
popular digital services, such as Google and Facebook, 
have put significant effort into assisting their users with 
decisions about what data to share and how to share it, 
enabling a diversity of privacy control mechanisms. 
Facebook, with its 1.23 billion active users has worked 
hard to create awareness about sharing data publicly. 
The company has created one of the most extensive data 
management control dashboards and implemented a 
version of privacy mirrors [26] allowing users to see how 
others might see their content prior to publishing it [12]. 
Facebook has focused the majority of its privacy 
controls on helping users manage their disclosure to 
other people in their network. There are few controls 
available for managing how Facebook itself might utilize 
user data. 3  The company’s business model relies on 
monetizing its users’ information in ways that are not 
always made explicit. Users can control some of the 
advertising content they see but the reasoning and 
mechanics behind the classifications that users can 
manage is impossible to determine. This opaqueness can 
cause consternation as users attempt to figure out how 
Facebook manages to know too much about them.4 Such 
consternation may lead to self-censure as users realize 
that in their use of Facebook they are not only disclosing 
information to their networks but also to Facebook itself 
[13]. 
In this paper we investigate how users think about 
their responsibilities for personal data, and question 
whether the responsibility put on them is realistic. We 
focus on Facebook, due its popularity and the complexity 
of the decisions that users must make about information 
disclosure given the tools Facebook makes available. 
2 BACKGROUND 
Concerns about privacy on social network sites (SNS) 
have fuelled a considerable amount of research on how 
users manage their identity [9], self-presentation [3], 
friends [14], and sharing [1] on Facebook. In discussions 
of data disclosure and the attendant context collapse, 
scholars have occasionally come to conflicting 
conclusions. For example, while people might use 
Facebook in ways similar to creating exhibits of the self, 
                                                                        
3 https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/ 
thus tightly controlling self-presentation to manage 
privacy [19], the site is also a tool for relational 
management [14] and for exchanges of support [21] – 
actions that could potentially lead to considerable 
disclosures. Despite the care that many put into deciding 
what to post [5,10], individual expectations of audience 
[6] and privacy are rarely correct [1].  
Over the years, Facebook has paid close attention to 
research, developing features and services that address 
user concerns, resulting in one of the most complex and 
granular privacy control interfaces. Through research 
we know quite a bit about how people use Facebook 
privacy controls to manage interpersonal information 
disclosure [42]. Yet such disclosure controls are difficult 
to manage not only because of their complexity but also 
because of the competing pulls on our needs and our 
obligations [33,38]. As Vertesi et al. [38] point out, there 
is “a moral economy of data management” and people 
often feel responsible for data sharing as well as for data 
management. 
Despite the proliferation of research, however, few 
scholars have paid attention to how users are engaging 
with the fact that their activities are disclosing their data 
to Facebook itself [37]. When opening a Facebook 
account every user has to agree to an extensive terms of 
service document detailing Facebook’s treatment of user 
data. As Facebook changes this document, users are 
asked to agree to the changes. In effect, the user is held 
responsible for their decision to accept the terms of 
service and to enter into what essentially amounts to a 
commercial relationship with Facebook. The extensive 
terms of service and the complex outward facing privacy 
controls require certain epistemic capabilities from the 
users. The act of knowing is a prerequisite for acting 
responsibly [32] and knowing can only be achieved if the 
necessary information is made available. Yet, 
information availability does not necessarily equate to 
responsible action [32,33]. 
3 THREE CONCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY 
The problem of privacy has been a focus of both scholarly 
and popular attention for decades [29,41]. From a 
technical perspective, a lot of effort has been made in the 
design of privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) to 
address the issue. In their 2010 review, Danezis and 
Gurses [12] identify three conceptions of privacy that 
underpin various PETs – confidentiality, control and 
practice. This classification illustrates how different 
underlying conceptions of privacy result in systems that 
attempt to facilitate different kinds of behaviour and 
allows us to highlight the role of consent mechanisms. 
4 https://tinyurl.com/y9t6gdpy; https://tinyurl.com/yb43msya  
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3.1 Privacy as Confidentiality 
The concept of confidentiality in the context of 
information technologies encompasses the individual’s 
right to keep data private and to protect against 
unauthorized access to information [12]. Properties such 
as unlinkability (the inability to determine whether two 
objects of information are related), undetectability 
(inability to determine if an object of information exists 
or not) and unobservability (when objects of information 
are not discernible from one another), are key 
components for establishing data confidentiality. These 
properties support the promise of anonymity by 
disconnecting data from the individual, preventing 
identification and as a result potentially alleviating 
concerns for privacy infringement [4]. Anonymity is a 
difficult proposition as the amount of data about 
individuals and their practices proliferate and disparate 
datasets can be combined to enable de-identification 
[24]. A secondary question remains – anonymity 
towards whom, the general public, other users or service 
providers?  
3.2 Privacy as Control 
The concept of control offers a more compromising 
stance, acknowledging the advantages of data collection 
provided that it is possible to manage who can access 
information and in what circumstances [12]. The key to 
doing so resides “in a combination of a measure of 
identity control for the user while still providing enough 
identity data for the service provider to be able to reach 
and re-identify the user” [18]. As a result, it is the users’ 
responsibility to mediate between the providers of 
identity management systems and third parties. This 
approach puts control and decision making in the hands 
of the user, thus absolving the data collector of 
responsibility to guard against privacy violations. As 
Danezis & Gurses point out: “This is of course an illusion, 
and being in the middle of a sticky situation does not 
automatically put one in control of anything” [12]. The 
issues come from the problem with very notion of 
consent and the common fallacy of the idea that 
individuals have the power to self-govern. 
3.2.1 The problem of consent. Consent mechanisms are 
crucial for performance of epistemic responsibilities as 
they are intended to provide the user with the 
information necessary to make informed decisions [34]. 
Informed consent is intertwined with responsible action 
and has become one of the primary gatekeepers of 
privacy [4]. In reality users are asked to consent prior to 
use of devices or services by making an informed 
decision about disclosure of data produced in the future 
for use by an unknown number of actors for purposes 
that are mostly impossible to predict. Clearly this is an 
impossible demand making the mechanism of consent 
problematic beyond the issue of presenting complex 
information to users in a simpler form [8,20,39]. Worse, 
interaction online typically includes both explicit and 
implied consent mechanisms making the problem even 
more difficult to unravel [4]. As a result many users feel 
helpless in the face of data harvesting by digital services 
[2, 31]. 
3.2.2 The Fallacy of Self-Governance. The concept of 
control over personal data is based on the idea that the 
user is able to evaluate the compromise between privacy 
concerns and the benefits of achieving a goal from a 
cumulative and holistic perspective [34]. Yet the 
boundaries of who is allowed to know what must be 
continuously negotiated with the ever growing body of 
entities collecting and processing personal data. People 
have little time for privacy self-management, even if all 
the knowledge required to do so is made readily 
available [27]. Regardless of the users’ degree of intent 
in protecting their privacy, the sheer complexity of 
understanding and practicing privacy self-management 
is often too monumental a task to bear [4]. Achieving the 
goal of effective privacy practice is unlikely, in particular 
because clearly identifying the compromises actually 
being made is not possible. 
3.3 Privacy as Practice 
Privacy as practice is a familiar reframing of privacy to 
HCI scholars [5,19,29,31,36,38]. In this view, managing 
privacy in everyday life requires an understanding of 
social norms, values, and expectations as these are 
enacted in socio-technical systems in practice. The idea 
of privacy as practice is harder to systematically 
implement in digital systems. However, there are several 
implementations of interest. For example Facebook’s 
implementation of the ability to see what an individual 
profile looks like to other users is a version of a privacy 
mirror – a socio-technical design framework proposed 
by Nguyen & Mynatt [26] in order to address privacy 
issues present in ubiquitous computing. The authors 
argue that such a mirror can assist users in 
understanding a socio-technical system and reflecting on 
their current practices helping them assess if changes are 
needed. 
As the number of devices and services proliferate, 
user data management evolves to accommodate these as 
part of everyday relational practices. The increasing 
complexity of data sharing and management practices 
precludes significant attention paid to any one service, 
privacy policy or end user license agreement [17]. 
Attending to practice allows us to consider what current 
digital systems expect the users to do, how users 
understand these expectations and whether these are 
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achievable. By focusing on Facebook use in practice, we 
explore how users think about and perform 
responsibilities of data management. We take this as a 
basis for our study and explore how notions of control 
and confidentiality frame and shape the way participants 
understand their interactions with Facebook. 
4 METHODS 
We developed a mixed method framework based on the 
gamestorming [16] approach as a foundation for 
engaging with existing Facebook privacy mirror 
implementations [26]. We used scenario building [23] to 
surface user privacy practices supplemented by a means-
end approach [30] and laddering [28] to afford further 
elaboration. We used grounded theory inspired 
mechanisms as a systematic analytical framework for 
iterative open and thematic coding of our data 
throughout the study [35]. 
Gamestorming approach. Gamestorming facilitates 
activities that enable participants to create 
representations of their practices, through physically 
mapping a particular process and then eliciting values in 
order to experiment with ways to address the emerging 
challenges [16]. The method provides participants with 
a goal and a sense of direction while simultaneously 
remaining flexible enough to allow for emerging topics to 
be explored. In our implementation, participants were 
confronted with the goal of mapping their digital practice 
on Facebook on paper.  
Means-End approach. In essence, the means-end 
method is used to explore the interconnectedness 
between the means and the end. In addition, it assists in 
revealing how the user assigns value to different criteria 
of choice, and why some are weighted higher than others 
[30]. In our case, we were interested in motivations or 
attitudes that serve as the driving force behind a user’s 
decision to disclose information. Thus we designed the 
questions of the opening phase of our interviews to 
explore and challenge the users’ perception of the 
consequences of their data sharing decisions on 
Facebook. 
Scenario building. A systematic way of simulating 
situations can be achieved through scenario building. 
Following Meinert we designed our scenarios to be 
novel, multifaceted, believable, comprehensive and 
never right or wrong [23]. Our scenarios (Appendix 1) 
were intended to confront participants with realistic 
circumstances. Participants were asked to articulate 
their feelings and how they would act in such conditions.  
Laddering approach. Laddering technique begins 
interviews with questions that frame and then gradually 
increases the level of abstraction through questions such 
as “Why is that important to you?” in order to investigate 
beliefs, feelings and goals behind a specific decision [30]. 
This is especially useful in semi-structured interviews as 
it “[...] can produce relatively structured knowledge 
because the interviewer can slowly ‘‘climb the ladder’’ … 
enabling the creation of meaningful mental maps” [28]. 
We ensured that our questions moved from very specific 
to more abstract in each part of the interview. 
Privacy Mirror. Privacy is an abstract concept and 
studies of privacy often run into what many have termed 
the attitude–behaviour gap or the privacy paradox 
[31,34]. Discussions of attitudes and beliefs can be more 
productive if participants are confronted with the 
apparent contradictions between their earlier responses 
and the reality of their practices. We used Facebook’s 
app permissions screen to make real participant’s actual 
disclosure practices towards the end of the interview.   
4.1 Interview Design & Sample Description 
Our study was designed to disturb, to surprise and to 
force participants to reflect on their Facebook use 
practices. The interviews were designed as a three-phase 
process (Appendix 2). The opening phase used 
Gamestorming to map Facebook use practices. In phase 
2 we asked participants to discuss the scenarios, while 
continuously referring to their process map. The 
scenarios were fictional yet plausible and referenced 
what users have agreed to in Facebook’s EULA and ToS. 
The closing phase used a Privacy Mirror, asking 
participants to open their Facebook profiles and walk 
through privacy settings and app permissions. This 
confronted the interviewees with what data about them 
connected applications were accessing through 
Facebook. Throughout we relied on Means-End and 
Laddering for structuring our interactions. In doing so 
we created a situation of deep reflection and discovery 
anchored in the realities of personal data leakage. 
We conducted a total of 21 qualitative semi-
structured interviews with participants that identified as 
active Facebook users, accessing the site at least daily. 
We stratified by age and gender to attain a diverse 
sample. Previous research suggests gender and age are 
important factors in perceived privacy risks [17, 40]. Our 
sample included 10 male and 11 female respondents to 
ensure gender parity and comparability. Average age of 
participants was 35.9 (range 18 to 68).  
5 FINDINGS 
Throughout the study  participants consistently 
expressed a strong sense of personal responsibility for 
their actions on Facebook at the same time as they 
professed frustration and a sense of helplessness. Three 
themes emerged in our analysis: the notion of ideal or 
aspirational personal data management behaviour, 
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frustration with others who fail to live up to such 
behaviour and frustration with the self for the inability 
to perform as the ideal required. In the sections below 
we first describe these themes. We then use our data to 
reframe how common privacy concerns might be more 
productively understood. 
5.1 The Ideal of Personal Data Management 
The majority of attempts to support users in managing 
their personal data make the assumption that users 
should be empowered to make individual decisions 
about data disclosure [8,9,12,20]. Fundamentally, this is 
rooted in the notion of informational self-determination, 
the idea that individuals are able to make decisions on 
their own behalf given sufficient information. In effect, 
this means that provision of information through ToS 
and EULA makes the users directly responsible for their 
data disclosure decisions. Research repeatedly shows 
that many have internalized this responsibility [39,40]. 
Our participants too expressed the conviction that they 
ought to be able to “do better” at managing their own 
data. Throughout the interviews many noted that they 
needed to make a more active effort in managing data 
flows and considering how their personal data was 
presented in different contexts: “I think you always have 
to keep in mind how private you are – what you want to 
share with who” (Interview #7). 
We repeatedly observed that our interviewees saw 
loss of control over their personal data as their own fault. 
Many then argued that it was up to them to regain control 
and to be more informed. For many it was about the: “[...] 
responsibility that you choose to take for yourself and your 
own information” (Interview #4). In fact, the only way to 
behave responsibly with respect to data was through 
some form of control regardless of whether privacy was 
actually desirable: “That is the weird thing. I’m not quite 
sure I need to be so private, but I want to be in control” 
(Interview #5). 
Our data suggests that for our participants there was 
clearly an ideal behaviour for personal data management 
that they needed to live up to. This involved taking 
individual responsibility for being informed, reading 
policies and ToS, making an effort to be aware of 
changing data disclosure commitments and managing 
their own data disclosure practices alongside privacy 
settings with some panache. This was especially evident 
during the privacy mirror exercise when participants 
were confronted with the fact that they had not realized 
how many apps they allowed access to their personal 
data. When discovering this some were outraged 
because they thought they should have had a choice 
about this or at least a reminder. Others immediately 
acted by restricting access because: “[...] this was one 
thing that I wasn’t aware of and it is one thing I can take 
control of.” (Interview #5).  In all interviews, however, 
participants came back to discussing their own 
responsibilities and evident failures. 
Only four interviewees were already aware of 
Facebook app settings and had previously adjusted 
these, explaining: “[...] it comes back to the more I can do 
to limit the data” (Interview #11). Throughout the 
conversation it became clear that our participants 
internalized the responsibility for their own data. They 
saw control and forethought as ideal behaviours 
necessary to achieve proper data management. They also 
expected their social ties to behave similarly. Here the 
tone of discussion often turned to moral responsibility 
for data hygiene of sorts. 
5.2 My friends can’t manage personal data 
In our discussions of Facebook, the relationship between 
the company and its users often came up as participants 
noted that the free service simply means a different kind 
of economic exchange. At the same time, many felt 
encouraged that their peers were becoming more 
informed about the terms of engagement with Facebook 
and the costs of its use:“[..] people are getting a lot more 
aware of the fact that we are the product on Facebook, so 
how much of a product do you want to be?” (Interview 
#11) 
Nevertheless, friends’ privacy practices still proved a 
cause for concern, especially given the implications of 
the privacy mirror exercise where it became clear that 
some of the apps have access not only to their own but 
also their friends’ data: “We all have those friends who are 
a bit retarded when it comes to social media” (Interview 
#10). After all, if they had to live up to tough expectations 
of control and forethought to manage their data 
properly, their friends would need to as well or all their 
efforts would be for naught: “[...] it is the same as group 
immunity. [...] 10% do something about it and the other 
90% are ruining it for other people because they don’t 
protect their privacy as far as they should” (Interview 
#10). As a result, our participants shared the same 
expectation of privacy self-management as an inherent 
notion of informed behaviour and expected both 
themselves as well as their peers to live up to it. 
However, despite their expectations and intentions, their 
practices did not reflect their responsibilities as initially 
proclaimed.  
Many of the participants privacy concerns appeared 
as contradictory to their behaviour. We argue that this 
was not because they did not care about protecting their 
privacy, but because the options that they had for doing 
so made the costs too great without any real and evident 
benefit. For instance, one of the participants stated that 
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he believed in privacy, ethics and morality and did not 
want his information flowing everywhere. However, 
when asked if the second scenario could happen to him, 
he revealed that he used a skin app to enhance the layout 
of Facebook and then reflected: “It’s really weird with the 
skin one because I know it's so [...] stupid that I want 
Facebook to look differently and then I allow people to 
take my data and give it to somebody else but then again… 
it makes me happy!” (Interview #1). The abstractions of 
privacy, ethics and morality can have less weight when 
confronted with the realities of pleasure and enjoyment.  
For our participants, responsibilities of data 
management may be individual, but they also 
understood that data exposure happens collaboratively 
just as often. They held their friends responsible for 
proper behaviour in part because it was not just their 
own actions that could result in exposure. The 
expectations they placed on themselves and their friends 
in terms of personal data management were difficult to 
accomplish. In a classic move of committing a 
fundamental attribution error, our participants excused 
or explained away the reasons for why they struggled to 
satisfy the ideal of responsible data behaviour but 
remained demanding of their friends. 
5.3 Failing to Live Up to Ideal Data Practices 
5.3.1 Interrogating consent. Many participants strived to 
live up to the ideal of the informed user who cares about 
their data. Yet, despite their efforts, they consistently 
failed to do so. This was perhaps most apparent when 
discussing their consent practices as nearly all of our 
participants confessed that they had never read or 
understood the privacy policies or end user license 
agreements for the services they installed and used: “I’m 
just clicking ‘yes’ at the moment, I’m not going through the 
actual terms and changes so I don’t know the consequence 
of the ‘yes’” (Interview #5) 
The participant quoted above is clearly aware that 
there is a problem with giving consent without knowing 
the consequences. When looking into the privacy mirror 
of app permissions on Facebook, it became clear to many 
participants that there was a big difference between 
what they were comfortable with and what they had 
actually agreed to. Consider the following discussion: 
“I think it is totally crazy that it needs so many things. 
I’m thinking, why is it interested in whether I’m in a 
relationship, work history, status updates, religious beliefs 
and pictures.”  
[Notices the large number of pictures the app can 
access]  
“Is that all of my pictures? [...] I think it is crazy! Can you 
remove it? [...] I did not know that you could see this. Some 
of them are from long time ago. I have no idea what this 
one is” (Interview #8). 
The example above starkly demonstrates how 
consent, even when it is explicit and presumably 
informed is not a meaningful mode of data disclosure 
control. Facebook offers a lot of post hoc controls so we 
asked whether participants might be willing to use the 
newly discovered privacy controls to adjust their 
preferences after the fact. The few that had tried to 
manage their privacy through the Facebook settings, 
explained that it was an extremely cumbersome process. 
As one participant reflected when managing which apps 
had access to his personal information: “What was really 
annoying was how difficult it was. There is no remove all 
or start over function. [...] I think they made it difficult on 
purpose, both to find and to do something about it, it took 
me about an hour to remove them” (Interview #10). 
To make matters worse, Facebook frequently updates 
privacy settings, making it increasingly difficult to 
ensure that user privacy preferences are aligned with 
their privacy settings at all times: “I don’t like that 
because it makes me feel like I never know how my profile 
is. Which also is something that makes me more cautious 
when I use it because I don’t really feel like I really know.” 
(Interview #14). Despite the motivation to act 
responsibly, actually doing so appears to be too difficult 
and time consuming. Facebook controls are so extensive, 
granular and varied, that it is possible to get lost in the 
minutia of multiple ways data are collected and used 
[27]. Our participants were frequently not sure how 
Facebook collects or utilizes their personal data, though 
most felt somewhat uncomfortable about it: “Wow… I 
didn’t know that. [I feel] horrified” (Interview #2). 
Surprisingly, when we asked them whether they saw 
themselves as informed, most told us they felt they were 
more informed than average at least until the experience 
of our interview.  
The ideal of informedness drove many to lament the 
problem but only four told us they wanted to actively 
learn more and asked for pointers. The rest took refuge 
in having a plan to do so at some unspecified later date: 
“but I am not totally ignorant. I plan to stay more 
informed. I know some sites where you can read a 
simplified version of the terms of use agreements” 
(Interview #5). This sort of plan in turn seemed to 
provide participants with a sense of control until we 
asked them how likely they were to follow through: “I 
know... But I don’t do. That’s the thing. And I’m a bit 
embarrassed to admit it, because I’m not fine with it. It is 
almost like you are asking me about my position in the 
universe. It is actually not that easy to relate to, because it 
is something you use every day without really thinking 
that hard about it and you really have to think hard about 
In the User We Trust  SMSociety, July 2018, Copenhagen, Denmark 
 
 
your behaviour in order to be a super user and protect all 
of your information” (Interview #5) 
It is possible to dismiss the quote above as merely a 
peculiarly self-aware example of privacy paradox. 
However, here the ability to be a responsible knower is 
equated to the ability to comprehend one’s “position in 
the universe” and is inherently impossible. While having 
a plan can provide some sense of control, no matter how 
illusory that control may be, really thinking about how 
well one can manage one’s data is an overwhelming 
experience. Perhaps, just making plans for becoming 
informed are efforts to alleviate the stigma associated 
with not living up to the expectations inherent in the 
available privacy mechanisms. 
5.3.2 Reversing the privacy paradox. Although the 
response of consternation in the face of the privacy 
mirror was common, some participants responded in 
reverse. Some claimed initially they did not care about 
what happened to their data, but as we got an in-depth 
look at what they actually did on Facebook, their 
practices suggested much attention being paid to data 
practices. For example, one participant explained: “But I 
just do not mind it, and maybe something with the way I 
use Facebook that I in principle do not care what happens” 
(Interview #4). Yet, his Facebook profile was set to 
friends-only and he was also quite careful about what 
kind of content he posted: “[..] I've done some things from 
both the phone and on Facebook and changed the privacy 
settings a couple of times, for what friends and friends of 
friends have access to” (Interview #4).  
We observed this reversal of privacy paradox several 
times. Users initially proclaimed that privacy meant little 
to them, but had typically taken extensive measures to 
govern their data with care. This suggests that some 
aspects of being responsible for personal data have been 
internalized regardless of the attitudes expressed 
towards data disclosure. At the same time, those that told 
us they did not care about what happened to their data 
were far less outraged or disappointed by their privacy 
mirror experience. In essence, not caring about data 
disclosure may be a kind of survival mechanism in the 
face of the sheer impossibility of real control over 
personal data.  
Further highlighting these discrepancies, we found 
that even though data management is of great concern 
for all age groups, participants that were more positive 
about giving access to their personal data as a trade-off 
in order to access third party content tended to be 
younger: “I always sign in with Facebook. [...] Because it is 
just much faster for me. I mean, I’m very forgetful – I forget 
so many passwords that I don’t even think I remember my 
Facebook password. My Facebook is always signed in on 
my computer. So when I click sign in with Facebook, it 
instantly signs in.” (Interview #6). Yet even those 
participants that initially emphasized caution tended to 
use convenience as an explanation for their use of 
Facebook apps with suspect access permissions. 
 
6 REFRAMING COMMON PRIVACY CONCERNS 
Our data demonstrate that staying informed and 
behaving in a way that would attain the ideal of a 
responsible individual in a digital environment is 
impossible. Yet the problems and concerns we have 
identified are not new. We consider how these concerns 
might need to be reframed if they are to be addressed via 
design or policy decisions. 
6.1 Users Do Not Read ToS or EULAs 
No matter how well the terms of service or end user 
license agreements are written, displayed or presented, 
the majority of users ignore them [8,33,39]. They merely 
represent a hurdle rather than information offered for an 
informed decision: “[...] okay, I agree. How bad can it be?” 
(Interview #7). There are simply too many of such 
documents to read and really pay attention to. Besides, 
with data being leaked in myriad ways, paying attention 
to terms of service may seem a futile exercise: “it’s just 
blocking out the pain and knowledge of me sacrificing 
myself to the gods of the Internet. Like I just I don't see it 
anymore” (Interview #1).  
Even when participants were interested and willing 
to read these documents they came away dissatisfied. 
Despite the effort that Facebook has put into describing 
their advertisement and other data use practices, when 
you get down to it, there is really very little actual choice 
available. Thus our participants found themselves in a 
predicament, with no options to decline or negotiate the 
consent if they wanted to use this service. Informed 
consent is then a false ideal, as consent mechanisms do 
not help the users, but rather serve as ways to excuse the 
data collection practice while making the user 
responsible for decisions of disclosure [27,32,33].   
When asking participants to consider methods that 
would help them provide meaningful consent, 
intermediaries emerged as a common solution: “[...] I 
know there’s a website that tries to sum up the EULAs. I 
think that’s what we need. Just so the average person can 
get a quick overview of what you have the rights to” 
(Interview #2). No matter how well presented or well 
designed, consent mechanisms make assumptions of the 
user’s ability to essentially ‘vote with their feet’ if they do 
not like the data policies. This may be true for small-scale 
apps, but the social costs of quitting Facebook are 
enormous. Users disagreed with the fact that in accepting 
Facebook’s terms of service they give Facebook the right 
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to use their personal information without further explicit 
requests for consent. This was particularly true of the 
female participants who were significantly concerned 
with the fact that Facebook has the right to use the 
images they upload without the need for explicit consent. 
Some proclaimed that: “if I have a Facebook account and 
the terms say that they can use any of my pictures, yeah I 
wouldn't be able to be on Facebook then” (Interview #7) 
This is currently a part of Facebook’s policies, and, 
depending on the application settings, other companies 
have access to personal information and images as well. 
Perceptions of privacy risks and boundaries of what is 
considered acceptable have become afterthoughts for 
Facebook as the users, despite threatening to revoke 
consent, continue to use the platform. The majority of 
participants accepted that it is their responsibility to 
become informed and make informed decisions, even 
though they acknowledge that it is not a feasible task: “It 
is just read it and accept it, or accepted that you just accept 
it” (Interview #18).  
How can we address this issue through design or 
policy? After all, it seems untenable despite the efforts. 
We believe that there is value in reframing what is the 
problem here to address. Clearly this is about how 
companies in general and Facebook specifically obtain 
consent for the use of user data. The question is whether 
it should be the individual user responsibility to think 
about and manage what they post to Facebook or 
whether there is a way to distribute the burden of 
responsibility somehow. What if it was possible to 
implement distributed responsibility [32] for assessing 
and addressing data management among friends, groups 
or even networks? Is there a way for a service such as 
Facebook to implement a kind of data commons that 
would relieve the pressure on individuals and enable 
better and more informed decision making and 
negotiation about data use overall? This is both a design 
and policy concern, where instead of doing data usage as 
usual, data usage and service provision could be 
negotiated through collective bargaining 
implementations.   
6.2 Hard to Keep Up To Date With Policy Changes 
We find that users are unable to accommodate the 
requirements of what their consent entails. It was also 
evident that the participants were unable to keep up with 
the changes implemented in Facebook’s ToS and EULA 
over time:“[…] they actually increase the access they have 
to my personal life without me knowing it, as it is difficult 
for me to know when they change the terms – I don’t think 
they are very good at communicating it and it is very easy 
for them to ‘slip it under’” (Interview #7). This is a curious 
situation where Facebook seems to act like one of those 
frustrating friends on whom you have to rely despite 
their evident unreliability. 
The sense of being overwhelmed by the gravity of 
data disclosure decisions, in addition to the changes in 
privacy settings, can lead people to just give up and hope 
for the best: “When Apple comes with an update on the 
phone, it says AGREE or DISAGREE and you have to read 
this whole disclaimer through - which you don't every time. 
You just agree and hope that it meets the requirements. 
You trust them” (Interview #15). Participants almost 
wearily trust that Facebook will do what is right, as the 
time and effort required to remain informed is not a 
viable option. As a result Facebook users feel helpless 
because the frequency with which privacy policies 
change are difficult to keep up with but important to 
attend to: “I wasn’t asked about all of these things when I 
signed up back in the day. These are features they have 
added later on, so maybe it makes sense that they notify 
me […] that I haven’t changed any privacy settings, but 
they changed their basic premise” (Interview #10). 
Occasionally, they do invest time and effort into 
managing their settings, only to lose it all when privacy 
settings are reset to unsavoury and too open defaults 
after updates to the policies: “It’s because Facebook when 
they make changes they just make default settings so even 
if you had really good security at one point doesn’t mean 
you have it now” (Interview #14) 
Most users accept that it is their responsibility to be 
aware of changes and make decisions accordingly and 
the empirical material demonstrates that this choice is 
central for their privacy practices. “I choose not to share 
everything” (Interview #4) is a common response 
throughout the interviews. The general perception being 
expressed is that it is up to the individual to be cautious 
about what data they decide to disclose, and the 
participants argue that they are in control, because they 
do not write that many status updates. In this Facebook 
has succeeded in training its users to accept and 
internalize responsibility for their actions. There are 
design suggestions that we could make to note that users 
perhaps need more information or contextual highlights 
of what has changed and how this affects them. Yet our 
data illustrates that such suggestions will only serve to 
create more fatigue. Instead, we call for more 
thoughtfulness about the kinds of relationships 
Facebook has with its users and the kinds of expectations 
these relationships engender.  
The notions of brand trust and brand loyalty are 
common in marketing literature but are rarely discussed 
in HCI. Yet trust and loyalty are even more important to 
consider when thinking about the responsibilities 
involved in managing user data. As users fail the 
demands on individuals to act responsibly and to make 
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decisions about data disclosure, their only recourse is to 
trust the companies with whom they engage and to hope 
that trust is warranted. Here participants acknowledge 
the fallacy of self-governance as they articulate their 
frustration with unrealistic responsibilities of acquiring 
encyclopaedist knowledge, in order to engage in 
informed consent [27]. 
6.3 It is Difficult to be Private  
Despite the diversity in participants’ answers, the notion 
of ideal behaviour and discomfort about the failure to 
live up to it was consistently formulated. However, we 
noticed an age-related trend where younger 
respondents relied on Facebook to manage their social 
logistics across all areas of life to such an extent that the 
costs of quitting seemed enormous. However, when 
confronted with the scenarios and potential privacy 
risks, the female participants expressed more concerns 
about their personal data than male participants, 
confirming prior studies [17]. Instead, the youngest male 
participants expressed their appreciation of the 
functionalities provided by Facebook and claimed that 
there is no reason for concerns as long as the users apply 
some ‘common sense’ to their behaviour and come to 
terms with what they want to disclose.  
Older participants, in contrast, were far more 
concerned and careful about managing disparate data 
flows: “I actually make a point of keeping my Facebook 
account as detached from anything, either business or 
related things” (Interview #11). These users were much 
more likely to have examined and changed their privacy 
settings primarily in order to manage the range of 
personal relationships they have on Facebook and to 
guard against context collapse [19]. We noticed that the 
degree with which participants identified Facebook as a 
personal and private space increased with age. Older 
participants tended to be more conservative about what 
sort of content they were willing to share. They were also 
occasionally bewildered by how others in their social 
networks might disclose information about them. Where 
younger participants used Facebook for everything from 
managing schoolwork or professional contacts to 
posting family photos, older participants often explained 
that the major benefits for them were staying in contact 
with their family and distant acquaintances as well as 
remembering birthdays. The social costs of not using 
Facebook for older participants were thus much lower 
and more bearable. 
Regardless of differences in age or purpose of use, all 
participants routinely failed to live up to their own ideals 
of informed behaviour. In their attempts to enact 
meaningful self-governance and privacy practices on 
Facebook, they acknowledged and accepted 
responsibility for their own data and then failed to 
manage it. 
6.4 Control and Privacy Self-Management 
A common theme in our empirical material is that most 
of our participants did not necessary want to be more 
private than they were already trying to achieve. As we 
challenged their behaviours and their decisions, 
however, they repeatedly argued that they wanted to be 
in control of how their data are used. It was the lack of 
visibility of data flows on Facebook that made it difficult 
to be in control of personal information: “[..] one thing 
that is really annoying is that I don’t feel like I have any 
control; I can’t figure out when are people able to see what 
I’m doing. So if I like something and someone else likes it 
or someone else likes something of mine, can people see it? 
I have a very hard time figuring that out, it is not very 
transparent” (Interview 18). 
The more our participants became unnerved when 
confronted with the privacy mirror, the more they were 
likely to use the opportunity to restrict app access. Many 
then talked about the need for control and transparency 
to decide who gets access to which information. Some 
even suggested that they would be more inclined to 
share their personal information, if it was clearly visible 
where their data were being sent:“[..] you would be even 
more inclined to give up data about yourself if there was 
open honesty between the company and the user” 
(Interview #18). Yet more control does not necessarily 
mean better able to make informed decisions and enact 
privacy self-management [12]. In the privacy mirror 
scenario, we see clear examples of users having the 
option to control but little insight into the effects 
exercising control may have. After all, what does it mean 
in real terms that this or that application has “access to 
my information?” 
Terms such as ‘trust’ and ‘honesty’ were mentioned 
repeatedly when describing the relationship with 
Facebook. Evidently, our participants would like to be 
able to rely on the fact that trust and honesty are present 
in their relationship with Facebook but, frustratingly, 
these are not certain. Expecting the users to participate 
and live up to data responsibilities, redirects us to the 
problems introduced by consent mechanisms. We need 
to ask how meaningful are the controls available to users 
to manage their engagements with service providers and 
applications? What are they asked to decide or prevent, 
really? Our conclusion is that if we are to try and 
motivate people toward particular privacy-preserving 
behaviours, we need to be better at explaining not only 
why these practices are necessary, but also what they 
achieve in real terms. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
Privacy over the years has been unpacked [29] and 
defined as many things. Recently, Crabtree et al. [11] 
attempted to “repack privacy” for a networked world, 
concluding that if we are to consider privacy in mundane 
practice, the concept dissolves into everyday concerns 
with relationship management instead. They are not the 
first to posit that it may be more productive to 
conceptualize privacy as a relational concept [25,31,36]. 
As Nedelsky proposed in 1990: “The concept of privacy 
captures, illusively, important values such as people’s 
capacity to decide for themselves some of the ways they 
will or will not enter into relationship with others” [25]. 
Such a conception of privacy captures the very social 
nature of this construct. After all, what does it mean to 
enter into a relationship if it is not about gradual process 
of mutual disclosure from conversation to shared 
experience? The decision to share, to extend a hand, to 
be seen and heard, all of these are decisions about 
whether to enter into a relationship. This is why when 
unknown entities turn out to know an unexpected 
amount about us, this feels like such a violation because 
the fundamental choice of whether or not to enter into a 
relationship has been taken away. 
Berson argues that “data are not taken or given, 
rather data are achieved” [7] as part of fostering a data 
culture. Harking back to old organizational studies [15], 
from the point of view of Facebook maintaining 
relationships with its users is a way to acquire and 
maintain data that is a form of capital. Yet sharing, 
hoarding, using data are both economic and political acts 
at least from an institutional perspective. Berson [7] 
conceptualizes data as an interface between the self and 
the world – an interface that is constantly rediscovered 
and negotiated. Through data we connect with the world 
and with each other and as such, decisions about 
disclosure necessarily have to be situational rather than 
prospective as most current PETs demand [12].  
This processual view of data and privacy 
management, clarifies that the expectations set up by the 
current privacy management infrastructures are 
impossible and that the infrastructures themselves are 
inadequate to the task. The systems people engage with 
have taught them to take responsibility for their own 
data production and users have to a large extent 
internalized this. Yet the imagined ideal of responsible 
privacy management remains impossible to achieve. As 
people are confronted with problems they take refuge in 
the idea that if only they could have control they could 
probably manage better even as they realize such control 
is illusory [12]. Companies and legal systems then 
develop policies and technologies to provide some form 
of greater control. The problem is conceptualizing 
privacy and data as issues of control leads to individuals 
continually failing in exercising it. Empowering the user 
to take control of their data merely shifts untenable 
amounts of responsibility on them for decisions about 
data disclosure without actually changing the nature of 
the relationship they have with the providers of their 
digital services.  
Privacy and data, as Nedelsky, Berson and our 
participants teach us, are about relationships and it is the 
nature of relationships that we need to consider. The 
very idea of a ‘privacy concern’ comes from the post-hoc 
nature of the realization of violation as a result of our 
enactments of relationships with the world. The 
opaqueness of the kind of social sorting into categories 
that Facebook performs, even if made visible to those 
users that know how to find these, will always feel like a 
violation because the choice of imparting such 
knowledge is part of the decisions we make in whether 
or not to have a relation with the entities that surround 
us. This can be interpreted as a loss of control, but that 
would be too simplistic. The common solution – give 
control to the user to either reject the categories or to 
correct them – addresses the wrong reason for the 
feeling of violation. In constructing technology to deal 
with the issues of data we need to ask what patterns of 
relationships among people and between people and the 
digital environments, the data production and the 
infrastructures we build do we want to support? 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 – Interview scenarios 
# Name Scenario 
1 Log-in 
with 
Faceboo
k 
You find an interesting article from a popular online 
magazine. The website notices that you are using a software 
to block their ads. As a result the magazine will therefore not 
let you access the article unless you turn off the ad blocking 
software.  
 
However, you can keep using the software if you log in with 
your Facebook account.  
2 The 
‘Free’ 
App 
One of your friends on Facebook sends you a 
recommendation to try out a free Facebook game. It is a really 
popular game, and since your friend has sent you a request, 
you decide to try it out. 
 
Later, you find that the company behind has a partnership 
with an advertising company known for collecting and selling 
personal data. 
3 Faceboo
k Ad 
You posted a group picture on Facebook of you and your 
friends having fun at Roskilde festival posing with beers.  
 
You later see that the photo has been used in a Facebook ad. 
Due to the license agreement you can not change this. 
4 Location 
based 
service 
In relation to your work you go to a meeting with your 
colleagues to meet with several employees from one of your 
clients.  
 
The following evening after the meeting, you notice that 
Facebook suggests adding the client’s employees to your 
friend list regardless of having no common connections. 
Privacy mirror 
 Faceboo
k App 
setting 
review 
[Ask to see the participants app settings on Facebook (which 
apps can see what?). In case of none apps, show them the 
friends app feature] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 – Interview structure 
1. Outset 1.1 Have you had experience using Facebook? 
1.2 When did you start using Facebook? 
1.3 What is the benefit of using Facebook? 
1.4 Have you experienced any problems/shortcomings of 
using Facebook and the available functions? 
2. 
Anchoring 
2.1 What are your main purposes of using Facebook? 
2.2 What characteristics of Facebook help you achieve these 
purposes? 
2.3 Why is each purpose important to you? 
2.4 What purposes could be achieved through other means? 
3. 
Behaviour / 
Practice 
3.1 How do you feel about this situation? 
3.2 How would you act? 
3.3 Could this happen to you? 
4. Practices 4.1 How do you feel about the scenarios? 
4.2 How could these scenarios be avoided? 
4.3 How do you feel about your current practices on 
Facebook?  
4.4 How would you change your practices? 
5. Possible 
Contradicti
ons 
5.1 What motivates you to keep using the service? 
5.2 What would motivate you to stop using the service? 
5.3 What would need to change in order to make you 
reconsider using the service? 
6. Informed 
behaviour 
6.1 Did you consider yourself an informed Facebook user? 
(refer to app setting review) 
6.2 Would you consider your methods for staying 
informed/increasing your informedness sufficient? 
6.3 Which tools / abilities would empower you to provide 
meaningful consent and engage with the service in a more 
informed behaviour 
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